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Debating the Early Soviet Nationalities Policy: the Case of Soviet Ukraine 
Olena Palko1 
The February Revolution marked the starting point of a complicated process of social, political 
and economic transformation within the Russian Empire. Nationalist movements emerged on 
the peripheries demanding sovereignty; with the Provisional Government attempting to 
accommodate these disperse demands for autonomy and independence. Nonetheless, it was 
the October Revolution and the Soviet regime that irreversibly changed the administrative and 
cultural map of the former autocratic and centralised empire. Guided by the principle of 
‘national in form, socialist in context’, the new central government encouraged the formation 
of various heterogeneous communities with distinctive national identities. The Soviet Union 
would thus come to be defined as ‘the world’s first Affirmative Action Empire’ or ‘the world’s 
first state to institutionalize ethno-territorial federalism.’2 However, by the end of the 1920s, 




The Bolsheviks’ view on the national question evolved overtime and the tactics of the party 
were defined by the immediate political, economic and social context as well as their short-
term and long-term objectives. While the Russian Civil War required quick solutions to the 
almost total political and social alienation in which the Bolshevik Party often found itself, 
victory over their political and ideological rivals raised the question of how to modernise the 
country. With a century-long legacy of backwardness and distrust of central institutions, the 
problem was how to make such a diverse population contribute willingly to the Soviet project. 
The first objective could be achieved by tactical engagement of local activists and interest 





There was yet another important difference: the Bolshevik experience of the civil war varied 
significantly depending on the border republic where local challenges determined the amount 
of concessions the party was ready to make to achieve victory. By contrast, the success of the 
Bolshevik modernisation and sovietisation projects was a universal objective to be achieved 
through the new nationalities policy of korenizatsiia (literally, indigenisation), launched in 
1923 Union-wide. Korenizatsiia was designed to exploit the national factor in the political 
modernisation of diverse peoples of the Soviet Union and to propagate universal Soviet values 
in a variety of national languages. Its ultimate goal was to ‘usher the entire population through 
the Marxist timeline of historical development’3 and to achieve socialism. 
 
 
Soviet Ukraine represents one of the most fruitful cases in examining the objectives and 
limitations of the Bolshevik approach to the national question. The republic, with its economic 
and social potential, would be crucial to the success of the wider revolution. Nevertheless, 
unlike most newly created Soviet republics, Ukraine had a relatively well-developed national 
movement and a history of independence, albeit short-lived. Consequently, here the 
Bolsheviks had perhaps the most arduous experience of the civil war and it took three 
campaigns for the Red Army to win over the republic. In addition, Ukraine’s contiguous 
western border made the republic an ideological battlefield and an outpost of Soviet foreign 
policy. This struggle later manifested over party divisions on the implementation of 




This chapter conceptualises the Bolshevik approach to the national question in the Soviet 
border regions by examining how local challenges forced the central party leadership to adjust 
its universal objectives. In the case of Ukraine however, this process of elaborating and 
implementing the nationalities policy was not linear. The civil war and the korenizatsiia policy 




Self-determination versus party centralisation: the Bolsheviks and the civil war 
During the pre-war years, Lenin was greatly engaged in polemics with other European 
socialists over the national question, perceiving its solution as being closely linked to an 
anticipated European war. Lenin awaited that such a conflict would lead to a defeat of the 
great empires, especially the tsarist monarchy, this ‘most reactionary and barbarous of 
governments,’ and thus contribute to the socialist cause of proletarian emancipation.4 
According to him, the immediate support to national struggles within the empire’s borders 
would help the proletarian revolution in the long-term. This prompted him to introduce 
popular slogans of national self-determination into the Bolsheviks’ programme and proclaim 
the national question an inherent part of the international revolutionary movement. As 
explained in April 1916, the task of the proletariat could not be achieved ‘unless it champions 
the right of nations to self-determination.’5 
 
 
Indeed, Lenin’s approach was reflective of the wartime zeitgeist: nationalist movements were 
on the rise worldwide and national elites kindled patriotic feelings and national pride among 
their fellow countrymen. Such movements also thrived in the former Russian Empire. 
Nonetheless, the Provisional Government, while condemning the restrictive tsarist regime, 
 4 
declaring the equality of all citizens and ensuring cultural autonomy, failed to respond to the 
demands of regional separatists. The final decision on the national question was postponed 
until the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, the elections to which were scheduled for 
late-November 1917. Such moderate response corresponded to the horizon of expectations of 
the political leaders in Ukraine, however. The first legal act-declarations of Tsentral’na Rada 
(Central Council), the national legislative authority established in Kyiv on 4 March 1917, 
proclaimed Ukraine’s autonomy and reassured its non-separation from Russia ‘in order that 
we and all her peoples might jointly strive toward the development and welfare of all Russia 
and toward the unity of her democratic forces.’6 
 
 
The October Revolution, however, changed this mainstream autonomous orientation. Local 
elites, often with foreign help, quickly reacted to the events in the former imperial capital and 
started making provisions for independence. Those actions did not contradict the announced 
Bolshevik position on the national question: ‘The Declaration of Rights of the People of 
Russia’, issued shortly after the Bolsheviks had taken power in Petrograd, guaranteed equality 
and sovereignty for all peoples within the former Russian Empire, ranging from self-
determination to complete independence. It also called to put an end to Russification and 
replace ‘the unworthy policy of falsehood and distrust, of fault-finding and provocation’ with 
‘an open and honest policy which leads to complete mutual trust of the people of Russia.’7 
 
 
The declaration of the right to self-determination had an explosive effect on the former 
Romanov Empire. By 1920, Poland, Finland and the Baltic States were fully independent 
while national movements had emerged in the Caucasus and Central Asian provinces, leading 
to the formation of separate republics in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. In Ukraine, where 
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neither the socialist-oriented Ukrainian People’s Republic, nor the German-controlled 
conservative Ukrainian State were able to consolidate their power, the demands for self-
determination were voiced by left radicals. Members of both the Bolshevik and non-Bolshevik 




However, the threat of complete disintegration of the former empire and subsequent loss of 
control over the region forced the Bolsheviks to reconsider their general democratic principles. 
The balance between self-determination and party organisation needed to be found. Hence, 
the experience of the civil war in the borderlands became the first instance when Bolshevik 
theory and practice diverged. Indeed, in his early writings, Lenin expressed great tolerance to 
local separatism and nationalism. Nonetheless, this affirmation was always subordinate to the 
ultimate goals of the proletarian revolution. With more regional governments attempting to 
achieve independence, the party’s central leadership needed to clarify its understanding of this 
abstract right. Pivotal to these debates was the question of who should represent the rights of 




On 28 January 1918, at his speech during the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Stalin, 
then Commissar for Nationalities, made it clear that self-determination was ‘a means of 
attaining socialism’ and as such should be limited only to the toilers of each nation.8 Yet the 
proletariat, following Lenin’s teaching, was ideologically immature and relied on its vanguard, 
the Communist Party. With proper guidance, the proletariat - the only bearer of the right to 
self-determination - would never secede from the world’s first proletarian state. As Stalin 
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explained, ‘now that Russia is a Socialist Republic and the champion of the great ideal of 
freeing the oppressed classes all over the world, there is no longer any reason for separating 
from Great Russia”.9 
 
 
Moreover, Lenin regarded self-determination as an exception, rather than a general rule. 
Between the two policies of self-determination and party organisation, the latter clearly 
prevailed: ‘Democratic centralism’ remained the main guiding principle in state and party 
organisation. As stated in the resolution of the 1919 Congress of the Russian Communist Party 
of Bolsheviks (RKP(b)), a separate status granted to the Soviet republics did not mean that the 
party would also be reorganised as a federation of independent communist parties. Instead, 
the central committees of the Communist Parties in these republics were recognised as 
regional committees of the RKP(b) and as such were entirely subordinated to its leadership.10 
 
 
Not surprisingly, this discrepancy between Bolshevik theory and practice was quickly 
exploited by those regional party and non-party leaders who continuously opposed 
centralisation. The first attempt to uncover Bolshevik hypocrisy in the national question came 
from within the party. In his pamphlets ‘Jesuits’ policy’ (1915) and ‘Russian social democracy 
and national question’ (1917), Lev Iurkevych, a former Ukrainian social-democrat, who after 
1905 joined a section of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDRP(b)) in 
Ukraine, accused the Russian Marxists of chauvinism, despotism and national enslavement.11 
In 1919, this critique was picked up by the Ukrainian Bolsheviks Vasyl’ Shakhrai, the 
Commissar for Military Affairs in the first Ukrainian Soviet government, and Serhii Mazlakh. 
In their brochure ‘Concerning the Moment: What is Happening in and to Ukraine’, the two 
Ukrainian Bolsheviks accused their Russian fellows of chauvinism, hence justifying 
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Ukraine’s claims for independence.12 Overall, early critiques of the Russian Bolsheviks 
concerned the discordance between a separate status of Soviet Ukraine and the inferior 
position of its Bolshevik party. 
 
 
The pamphlet was published during the heated debates between those demanding the 
autonomous status of Ukraine’s Bolshevik party and those promoting a centralised party 
organisation. The idea to merge different regional organisations of the RSDRP(b), which were 
mainly situated in the industrial Donbas area, into a separate Bolshevik Party was linked to 
the German occupation of Ukraine, under whose support the conservative government of 
Pavlo Skoropads’kyi was established in late April 1918. A Bolshevik leader in Ukraine, 
Georgii (Iurii) Piatakov argued that an autonomous party would have more control over and 
understanding of the situation in the region since the Russian Bolsheviks were simply too far 
away to respond on time. Piatakov’s motion, however, was rejected by the Katerynoslav group 
headed by Emanuil Kviring. Kviring spoke of the greatest importance of Ukraine’s industrial 
areas for the future of the Russian Revolution, which could be weakened if the autonomy of 
Ukraine’s Bolshevik party and Ukraine be adopted. 
 
 
Nonetheless, the escalation of the civil war forced the Russian Bolsheviks to finally define 
their stand on Ukraine. Bound by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the party could not declare war 
against Germany, an ally of nationalist governments in Ukraine. The creation of a Ukrainian 
Socialist Soviet Republic in March 1918 thus enabled the Bolsheviks, through the Ukrainian 
Soviet government, to enter into open war with the German occupation forces. Ukraine’s 
independence was compromised by the status of its Bolshevik party, however. Despite the 
decision of the Taganrog conference (19–20 April 1918) on the independent status of the 
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Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (KP(b)U), the first party congress, held in Moscow 
in July the following year, voted for its integration with the RKP(b). The KP(b)U retained an 
autonomous status with its Central Committee (TsK) acknowledging the authority of the TsK 
RKP(b); Stalin entered the Ukrainian TsK as the liaison with the RKP(b).13 
 
 
While the Russian and Ukrainian Bolsheviks were looking for options on how to reconcile 
their promises, other left-wing parties and movements went ahead in defending the 
unconditional sovereignty of a Soviet Ukraine. Admittedly, during the civil war the 
Bolsheviks did not have the rhetorical monopoly on preaching the ideas of proletarian 
emancipation and a socialist future, being obliged to compete with a number of native 
communist parties, the biggest of which was the Ukrainian Communist Party of Borot’bysty 
(derived from the party newspaper Borot’ba, Ukrainian for ‘struggle’).14 Stephen Velychenko 
maintains that these parties emerged in reaction to the moderate socialism of the Ukrainian 
nationalist government and chauvinistic Russian Bolshevik rule, which initially disregarded 
the national sentiment of the population.15 Their members believed that communism and 
nationalism were compatible, hence the revolution in Ukraine could be both social and 
national. There were disagreements about the possible cooperation with the Bolsheviks, 
however. The Borot’bysty’s decision to merge with the KP(b)U in May 1920 led to a major 
split among national communists, resulting in the creation of the Ukrainian Communist Party 
(Ukapisty), which existed, although as a small minority, until 1925.16 
 
 
During the civil war, the national communist parties underwent major transformations, 
gradually evolving towards an acceptance of the Soviet regime. Nonetheless, Ukraine’s 
independence remained their primary goal.17 They opposed the Bolshevik-led Soviet Ukraine, 
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since it united ‘all sorts of Russian nationalist elements from the Black Hundreds to the 
revolutionary intelligentsia in Ukraine […] joining forces with the Bolsheviks to help 
reconstruct a “united and indivisible Russia”.’18 The Bolsheviks themselves were considered 
as proponents of Russian imperialism19 and ‘a hypocritical party which continually violates 
its own principles’.20 Overall, their chauvinism was regarded as detrimental to the entire 
communist endeavour in Ukraine.21 
 
 
Nonetheless, in May 1919, in the face of General Anton Denikin’s advancing army, the 
Borot’bysty expressed their readiness to cooperate with the Bolsheviks and to share 
government responsibilities. The Bolsheviks, however, were wary of their fellow 
revolutionaries. On the one hand, they were desperately looking for political allies in the civil 
war, more so since the Ukrainian communists could offer a link with the resentful Ukrainian 
peasantry and intelligentsia. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks did not trust these parties. 
Lenin considered the Borot’bysty as ‘a party, which aims to split the military forces and 
supports banditism; it is violating the basic principles of communism and thereby plays 
directly into the hands of the Whites and of international imperialism.’ Whilst encouraging 
the merger, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks were instructed to collect information on ‘the non-
proletarian and most disloyal nature’ of the Borot’bysty activity.22 
 
 
In fact, in their early days, the Russian Bolsheviks hardly had any unified view on Ukraine. 
Their treatment of national affairs depended mostly on the immediate challenges which they 
faced on the ground. This lack of comprehensive policy perhaps explains why the Bolsheviks, 
while seeking alliances with local leftist movements, continuously persisted in their anti-
Ukrainian attitude and violently reacted against any nationalist sentiments within or without 
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the party. This discrepancy soon drove back the occasional support the party had managed to 
gather. It became clear that if the Bolsheviks wanted to establish control in the region, they 
needed to reconsider their attitude towards Ukraine. In short, the Bolsheviks needed to offer 
a feasible alternative to ‘bourgeois nationalism’ of the Ukrainian governments and national 
communists by embracing their separatist discourse. 
 
 
A turn in the national policy was marked by the TsK RKP(b)’s resolution ‘On Soviet Rule in 
Ukraine’ in late 1919. In the resolution, adopted after the victory over the Denikin’s White 
army, it was assured that the RKP(b) was committed to ‘removing all barriers to the free 
development of the Ukrainian language and culture.’ The Bolsheviks in Ukraine were 
instructed to treat the existing nationalist tendencies ‘with utmost patience and tact, countering 
them with a word of comradely explanation of the identity of interests of the toiling masses 
of Ukraine and Russia.’ Ukrainian was declared ‘a weapon of communist education of the 
toiling people’ and a tool in establishing ‘the closest contact between Soviet institutions and 
the native peasant population of the country.’23 The Bolsheviks, also seemingly, conceded to 
the debates on Ukraine’s independence. In his letter ‘To the toiling masses of Ukraine after 
the defeat of Denikin,’ Lenin reassured that it was ‘self-evident and generally recognised that 
only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can and will decide at their All-Ukraine 
Congress of Soviets whether Ukraine shall amalgamate with Russia or whether she shall 
remain a separate and independent republic, and, in the latter case, what federal ties shall be 
established between that republic and Russia.’24 
 
 
National communists were also invited to join the government of Khrystian Rakovskiy (in 
place until July 1923), where they occupied posts in education, justice and communication. In 
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addition, a merger of the national communist parties was initiated. In March 1920, some 4,000 
former Borot’bysty members were admitted to the KP(b)U on case by case basis.25 In total, by 
mid-1920, around 30 per cent of the KP(b)U’s 11,087 full members and 2,439 candidate 
members had previously belonged to other political parties.26 This unification of the leading 
communist movements initially proved to be mutually beneficial: the Bolsheviks were able to 
eliminate important political rivals while the Borot’bysty gained access to important leadership 
positions, further promoting Ukraine’s autonomy and cultural development from within the 
party ranks. For instance, the former Borot’bysty Vasyl’ Ellan-Blakytnyi and Oleksander 
Shums’kyi joined the TsK KP(b)U, the latter also acquired a seat in the Politburo. Arkadii 
Liubchenko became the TsK Secretary for Culture and the editor-in-chief of the party 
newspaper Kommunist. Since May 1919, Ukraine’s Commissariat for Education (Narkomos) 
was headed by the Borot’bysty - Hnat Mykhailychenko, Mykhailo Panchenko, Shums’kyi and 
Hryhorii Hryn’ko.27 In such a way, former Borot’bysty not only gained control over the 
republic’s cultural and intellectual life, but also started to play a decisive role in implementing 
the nationalities policy. It was under the Narkomos’ chief authorities that the main orders for 
the future policy of korenizatsiia were issued. 
 
 
Ethnic diversity versus assimilation: Korenizatsiia in the context of Soviet Ukraine 
As discussed above, to win the civil war and re-unite the former imperial territories, the 
Bolsheviks were forced to make concessions to nationalist sentiments and form alliances with 
non-Russian political elites. Nevertheless, these tactical agreements would not suffice if the 
Bolsheviks wished to consolidate their power and establish political and social systems that 
would last. More importantly, the Bolsheviks needed to change the way the party was perceived 
in Ukraine. Instead of an image of a Moscow-led occupying military force, it needed to become 
an embodiment of revolutionary and national liberationist ideals of the local population. This 
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change in approach reflected a more general moderation of nationalities policy within the 
Soviet Union. By the end of the civil war, it had become obvious that the national question in 
the peripheries could not be ignored, even more so with the threat posed by independent Poland, 
under Józef Piłsudski, to the recently acquired western Soviet borderlands. The possibility of 
losing Ukraine became especially apparent after the united Ukrainian-Polish Army drove the 
Bolsheviks out of Kyiv in May 1920. 
 
 
Amidst the Polish–Soviet war, Stalin highlighted the urgent need to reassess the position of the 
Soviet government on the national question and redefine the centre–periphery relationship. In 
October 1920, he observed that the very success of the Russian Revolution depended heavily 
on gaining trust of the peripheries: ‘central Russia, that hearth of the world revolution, cannot 
hold out long without the assistance of the border regions, which abound in raw materials, fuel 
and foodstuffs. The border regions of Russia in their turn would be inevitably doomed to 
imperialist bondage without the political, military and organisational support of more 
developed central Russia.’28 According to Lev Kamenev, another Bolshevik leader, the civil 
war had taught the party a valuable strategic lesson: ‘the unity between the centre and the 
periphery is necessary for the survival of both the centre and the periphery. The communist 
society in Moscow cannot be built without establishing a fair relationship with those peoples 




This new approach to the national question was approved by the 1921 Party Congress. Far-
reaching political, social and economic modernisation of the former imperial lands was seen 
as a remedy to the alienation of the peripheries, their distrust towards the centre and attempts 
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by local nationalists to solicit foreign intervention. State-encouraged modernisation and 
economic equalisation was therefore perceived as a means of spreading new Soviet values 
among outlying populations who would, consequently, contribute willingly to building 
socialism in the former Romanov Empire.30 However, to achieve this, party activists needed 
to ‘preach against [slogans of national culture] in all languages, ‘adapting’ themselves to all 
local and national requirements.’31 The Party Congress, therefore, called for a comprehensive 
national program, establishing local administration, promoting national languages and 
cultures and recruiting indigenous elites into the party rank-and-files. 
 
 
The success of this task relied on active participation of indigenous populations and the 
creation of new Soviet elites. As highlighted by Stalin, in order to make Soviet power ‘near 
and dear to the masses of the border regions of Russia,’ it was necessary to integrate ‘all the 
best local people’ into the Soviet administration, since ‘the masses should see that the Soviet 
power and its organs are the products of their own efforts, the embodiment of their 
aspirations.’32 However, ‘the best local people’ were not, as yet, members of the Bolshevik 
Party. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the civil war, the party looked to establish a 




To achieve this, the Bolsheviks, as discussed above, encouraged a merger of different political 
forces, especially of those who shared the Bolshevik proletarian discourse. In addition, the 
party found a compromise with the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, incentivising cooperation 
with numerous educated specialists and engineers, whose skills and technical knowledge were 
urgently needed during post-war reconstruction. Apart from this ‘toiling intelligentsia’, a 
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hybrid term coined to designate old ‘bourgeois’ specialists, the party sought reconciliation 
with recent political émigrés. Numerous Sovietophiles and zminovihivtsi (Rus. 
smenovekhovtsy), who showed readiness to reconcile with the former enemy and participate 
in building the Soviet state, received official amnesty and were invited to return to Soviet 
Ukraine.33 Lastly, the early 1920s proved to be the heyday of the so-called poputnyky (Rus. 
poputchiki) or fellow-travellers. The term was first used by Leon Trotsky to refer to artists 
who presented a kind of transitional art, ‘organically connected with the Revolution, but which 
[was] not at the same time the art of the Revolution.’34 
 
 
Engaging the old intelligentsia however, could offer only a temporary solution to the lack of 
loyal Soviet cadres. Indeed, they enjoyed a rather privileged position in the Soviet society and 
played an important role during the transitionary period of the early 1920s. However, those 
fellow-travellers who had offered their tacit support to the party in power could hardly 
disseminate Soviet values and inspire the masses to join the process of constructing socialism. 
Moreover, hardly any of them could become trustworthy representatives of Bolshevik ideology 
in the long run. While endorsing national differences, the party’s central leadership was 
ultimately seeking to create a homogeneous Soviet identity based on a shared set of values 
which could only be internalised through mass mobilisation and participation. 
 
 
Bohdan Krawchenko argues that Ukrainizatsiia of the KP(b)U had a demographic character: 
modernisation brought more rural Ukrainians to the cities, where they joined the working class 
and subsequently the party ranks.35 Ukrainizatsiia of the party ranks could not be spontaneous, 
however. It was designed to defeat critics from the left who did not regard the KP(b)U as a 
Ukrainian party with strong grassroots support. Thus engaging indigenous cadres soon 
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became a key priority, as defined by party congresses in 1921 and 1923. In the following 
years, party membership skyrocketed. The 1927 party census already attested that 69.7 per 
cent of party members and 99.5 per cent of candidate-members had joined in or after 1922.36 
Overall, this indigenisation of the party apparatus achieved incredible results. Within a couple 
of years, the number of Ukrainian bureaucrats increased from 35 per cent in 1923 to 50 per 
cent in 1925 and 54 per cent in 1926. The percentage of ethnic Ukrainians in party organs also 
grew from 23.6 per cent in 1922 to 47.0 per cent in 1927 and 53.0 per cent in 1930 while, by 
1926, the number of Ukrainians in the government amounted 56.5 per cent in 1926.37 
 
 
This party entrenchment served a much wider purpose: korenizatsiia was ultimately a policy 
of winning ‘hearts and minds’, a well-elaborated programme launched to draw the broad 
masses towards the Bolshevik party and their ideology. In the Ukrainian context, the main 
concern was the Ukrainian-speaking peasantry. Reaching out to the countryside could 
potentially help in overcoming continuing peasant resistance and bring the rural population 
into party and governmental work. Furthermore, by de-Russifying republican urban areas, 
Ukrainizatsiia might also continue the influx of workers through increased rural-to-urban 
migration. In Volodymyr Zatons’kyi’s words, the party should make cities less hostile and 
foreign (chuzhoi) to these new-comers through ‘creating an environment where the peasant 
gets used to seeing Ukrainian signs, announcements, and posters.’38 
 
 
While facing the ‘hostile’ peasantry was an accepted objective, the question of proletarian 
Ukrainizatsiia was one of the most difficult to agree upon. Historically, Ukraine’s cities were 
often Russian outposts, reflecting the century-long tradition of tsarist assimilation and 
Russification. In 1897, for example, native Ukrainian-speakers constituted less than a third of 
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the urban population.39 Increasing rural-to-urban migration during the 1920s changed this 
dynamic. As a result, by the middle of the decade, the republic’s industrial working class 
already consisted of three more or less equal groups: Ukrainians, whose national self-
identification was the same as their native language; non-Ukrainians (especially of Russian 
and Jewish origin); and Russified Ukrainians, who identified themselves as Ukrainians but 
whose native language was Russian. As a consequence, despite a common understanding of 
how important the working class was for comprehensive Ukrainizatsiia, the party was wary 
of defining these ethnically diverse proletarians as its immediate target since it could make 
the process appear non-voluntary. 
 
 
The question of whether the Russian-speaking industrial working class should be considered 
as a target of Ukrainizatsiia entered the Bolshevik agenda in earnest after the appointment of 
Lazar Kaganovich as First Secretary of the KP(b)U in March 1925. In June 1926, a TsK 
KP(b)U Plenum called for reinforcing comprehensive Ukrainizatsiia, encompassing the 
industrial proletariat, higher education, all-Union institutions and the government 
bureaucracy.40 Despite the many objectives, it was proletarian Ukrainizatsiia that sparked 
heated debates over the scope of this policy and exposed fundamental differences between 
central-oriented and Ukraine-minded factions in the KP(b)U. These debates once again 
exposed the limits of Bolshevik particularism, when the realities on the ground forced the 
party centre to reconsider their wider democratic intentions on the national question. 
 
 
In regards to Russian-speaking Ukrainians, the main challenge was whether to consider them 
as Russians or Ukrainians. In the first instance, they were to be exempt from the Ukrainizatsiia 
campaign, in the second – become its main targets. For Shums’kyi, now the Commissar for 
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Education, however, the working masses were not Russians, but Russified Ukrainians who 
simply needed to re-internalise native Ukrainian culture and language. Addressing the slow 
pace of the policy in Ukraine at the 1925 KP(b)U plenum, Shums’kyi pointed at those in charge, 
especially Kaganovich, who due to his ethnic origin and close ties to the centre (Kaganovitch 
was a Ukraine-born Jew and Stalin’s protégé) had little interest in the policy’s success.41 Hence, 
Shums’kyi suggested replacing Kaganovich with Vlas Chubar, Mykola Skrypnyk or another 
Ukrainian who would ensure proper implementation of Ukrainizatsiia.42 
 
 
Stalin indirectly responded to Shums’kyi’s criticisms in a letter to Kaganovich dated from 26 
April 1926.43 According to Stalin, the Commissar for Education had misinterpreted the very 
concept of Ukrainizatsiia, conflating Ukrainizatsiia of the party and other apparatus (a declared 
objective of the policy) with that of the republic’s proletariat. Ukrainizatsiia of the working 
class was supposed to be a natural and gradual process, whereas Shums’kyi was seeking to 
impose it ‘from above’. Forcing the Russian-speaking working masses to renounce their 
Russian language and culture, according to the Soviet leader, ‘contradicted the principle of the 
free development of nationalities [...] and [was] equal to national oppression.’ Stalin predicted 
that Ukrainizatsiia from above could provoke ‘an outbreak of anti-Ukrainian chauvinism 
among the non-Ukrainian proletariat’ as well as ‘the alienation of Ukrainian culture from the 




Following Stalin’s letter, Shums’kyi was quickly demoted and replaced by Skrypnyk, who was 
seen to comply with the centralist view on korenizatsiia. Indeed, Skrypnyk maintained Stalin’s 
view on natural Ukrainizatsiia of the republican working class, believing that ‘re-
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identification’ could be achieved by combining demographic Ukrainizatsiia with the necessary 
promotion of Ukrainian culture. Instead of enforced Ukrainizatsiia ‘from above’, Skrypnyk 
developed a strategy to encourage workers to identify themselves with Ukrainian culture and 
language. Since use of the Ukrainian language was obligatory only for government employees, 
the linguistic Ukrainizatsiia of the workforce could only be achieved by creating a total 
Ukrainian urban environment: a favourable setting in which the working masses would either 
convert or became inclined towards the Ukrainian language and a new proletarian culture.45 
 
 
This was to be accomplished by, firstly, increasing the prestige of the Ukrainian language and 
culture, and, secondly, bringing Ukrainian culture directly to the proletarians. Cultural work 
was therefore regarded as the main vehicle for drawing workers into the Ukrainian milieu. This 
included evening language and country studies courses, public lectures in Ukrainian, 
distribution of books and periodicals, organising reading circles, concerts, theatre 
performances and film screenings. As a result of the combined efforts of Soviet modernisers 
and Ukraine’s cultural managers, by 1934 three-and-a-half times as many workers identified 
themselves as Ukrainians than in 1926 and the percentage of the working class who identified 
as Ukrainian increased from 51.7 in 1926 to 59.2 in 1934.46 Nevertheless, Ukrainizatsiia did 
not make Ukrainian the everyday language of the urban populace. Despite concerted 
government efforts, Russian continued to dominate economic, industrial, political and 
academic spheres, whereas Ukrainian was confined to education, propaganda work and cultural 
initiatives.47 Instead of becoming mono-lingual, urban centres were transformed into enclaves 
of bilingualism where workers and state functionaries remained dominated by Russian culture.  
These overall moderate results raise the question of why the party centre attempted ardently to 





Indeed, in the Soviet hierarchy the working class mattered most with Bolshevik doctrine being 
entirely built around the necessity of working class mobilisation. The declared objective of 
industrialisation required a far bigger influx of workers, meaning that the party needed to 
continue reaching out to the peasantry, the source of the future workforce. Social and ethnic 
heterogeneity of the working class meant that there could never be a single ideological line on 
which the party could base its propaganda. Moreover, local factional struggles created a 
situation where multiple interest groups attempted to present themselves as the ‘vanguard of 
the working class,’ which, according to Lenin, could not formulate any independent ideology 
of their own. Since class political consciousness could only be brought to the workers from 
without,48 the party’s central leadership needed to react quickly against any non-authorised 
attempts to control the process of workers’ mobilisation. The factional struggle within the 
KP(b)U and the hostile international climate of 1926–27 had therefore made Ukraine’s 
Russian-speaking industrial working class the bastion of the Russian Revolution. 
 
 
Within the KP(b)U, Shums’kyi came to represent the Ukrainian faction, which consisted 
mainly of former members of national communist parties. Shum’skyi was one of their most 
prominent members, who made a successful career in the Soviet government and as a 
Commissar for Education oversaw the entire cultural and educational process in Soviet 
Ukraine. The success of Ukrainizatsiia reaffirmed Ukraine-minded communists that their 
vision of a Soviet Ukraine was indeed possible. James Mace somewhat optimistically 
suggested that ‘Skrypnyk temporarily achieved what Ukrainian communists had advocated 
since Mazlakh and Shakhrai, recognition that Ukraine was a country in its own right, ruled by 
a regime which was clearly Ukrainian in its policies and goals.’49 The reinforcement of 
 20 
Ukrainian separatism in the mid-1920s proved that the Bolshevik efforts to convert their 
former opponents into loyal followers through compromise had failed. Instead, the growing 
share of ethnic Ukrainian members and their preferential position within the party created a 
new Ukrainian Soviet elite, who started demanding more political, economic and cultural 
autonomy for their republic. 
 
 
The inner-party struggle was not the only threat to the success of korenizatsiia, as envisaged 
by the central leadership. Since the early debates on its implementation, there were regular 
concerns that the policy would unleash and reinforce nationalist forces on the ground. Party 
directives demanded high results in implementing Ukrainizatsiia but provided little to assist 
reaching set targets. For instance, despite the official declaration of its completion on 1 
January 1926, comprehensive linguistic Ukrainizatsiia among governmental employees was 
never met.50 Whereas governmental employees were usually passive in complying with 
Ukrainizatsiia requirements, the Ukrainian language and culture was aggressively promoted 
at the local level by the non-party intelligentsia. This led to ‘spontaneous’ Ukrainizatsiia, as 
nationalist elements started taking advantage of the benign climate in the republic. While 
Shums’kyi blamed the party’s failure ‘to capture, direct, and compensate non-party efforts 
appropriately,’ the central leadership blamed ‘anti-Soviet elements’, who had decided to 
capitalise on Ukrainizatsiia’s success.51 
 
 
As noted by Kaganovitch, Ukrainizatsiia led to two parallel processes: ‘the process of our 
growth, the growth of the Soviet culture and society; and the process of the growth of hostile 
forces, which attempt to master this process’52; the former was to be accelerated, the latter – 
combatted. The danger of those nationalists who, like the former Borot’byst Shums’kyi, 
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‘changed their tactics but not their ideology,’ was outlined in a top-secret GPU report ‘Ob 
Ukrainskom Separatisme’ (On Ukrainian Separatism), issued on 4 September 1926. 
According to the GPU, Ukrainizatsiia had been exploited by all those nationalists who, having 
given up their hopes for overthrowing Soviet power, accepted it as an unavoidable fact. 
However, they started using the new weapon of ‘cultural work’ to ‘place supporters of the 
national idea in all important parts of the state organism.’53 To regain control over the 
implementation of Ukrainizatsiia, the party needed to undermine public faith in this policy 
and the pre-revolutionary elites.54  
 
 
One of the biggest show trials of the late 1920s, concerning the alleged conspiratorial 
organisation Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukrainy, SVU), created 
an excellent opportunity to tackle both the old intelligentsia and eager local ‘Ukrainisers’. The 
SVU trial had serious repercussions and signalled a process of accelerated monopolisation of 
the artistic and cultural spheres in Soviet Ukraine. Firstly, it led to the elimination of the 
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences’ autonomous status, thereafter subjugating it to the party 
agenda. Secondly, the trial brought to an end the lenient attitude towards zminovikhivtsi and 
fellow-travellers, many of whom were direct targets of prosecution. Thirdly, it weakened the 
local initiative for Ukrainizatsiia, since some 30,000 people, including many Ukrainian 
educators and schoolteachers, were arrested in connection to the SVU.55 
 
 
There was yet another element to the Shums’kyi affair. Before occupying the post in the 
Narkomos, Shums’kyi had been the Ukraine’s representative in Poland and a liaison to the 
Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU). The KPZU, seen as a mechanism to influence 
the alignment of political forces in Poland, was financially and ideologically supported by 
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Moscow. Nonetheless, the Ukrainian question was one of the most significant in the KPZU 
program and its members aimed to unite all Ukrainians, including those under Polish and other 
western governments, within the borders of Soviet Ukraine. KPZU representatives ardently 
embraced Shums’kyi’s vision of a comprehensive Ukrainizatsiia and later expressed great 
concern over his demotion in 1926. To make matters worse, the defection of the KPZU 
leadership occurred at the height of the war scare of 1926–27, when Soviet leaders were 
anticipating an attack from an alleged anti-Soviet coalition, with Poland at its forefront. 
Unsurprisingly, Shums’kyi’s Polish-backed calls for wider political autonomy quickly came 
to be perceived as anti-Soviet. In 1926, foreign considerations took over practical necessities, 
and korenizatsiia, originally designed to foster a positive image of the Soviet authorities 
internationally, was recalibrated along national security lines. 
 
 
Lastly, by the end of the 1920s, the objectives of korenizatsiia began to directly conflict with 
other core Bolshevik policies. Rapid industrialisation led to a major clash between central and 
regional elites, who sought to maximise regional control over the allocation of investment 
resources and demanded more authority in economic administration.56 The Soviet Union, 
despite its federalisation, acted as one economic entity with decentralisation perceived as a 
threat to the wider modernisation project. It was clear that successful industrialisation required 
constant centralised planning and control over regional performance. This was administrated 
by a single Central Planning Committee, or Gosplan, established in 1921, whose authority 
widened significantly by the decade’s end. Such economic dependency contradicted the view 
of the regional elites, for whom ‘nationality, resources, and local political power [became] 
officially linked.’57 Hence, by the end of the twenties, korenizatsiia’s economic aspects came 
to the fore, demanding economic decentralisation of the Soviet Union to correspond to its 




The debates on the amount of regional control over the national economy were especially 
heated in Ukraine, since the republic was seen as key in delivering production targets. The 
demands came from both within the KP(b)U leadership and the non-party elites and ranged 
from the need to reconsider industrial locations to transforming Ukraine into a single economic 
unit. At the 1927 Party Congress, Kaganovich advocated expanding planned targets and 
increasing capital investment in the republic.58 The KP(b)U leader aimed to reinforce Ukraine’s 
former industrial dominance and continuously defended local interests at the central level. The 
economic side of Ukrainizatsiia, however, was formulated by two economists, Hryn’ko and 
Mykhailo Volobuev. From 1924 to 1926 Hryn’ko, a former Borot’byst, had overseen the 
Ukrainian Gosplan before taking the post of deputy head of the all-Union Gosplan. Volobuev 




The plan for rapid industrialisation reignited the debate on regionalisation, according to which 
the republic was seen as a number of administrative districts with different economic functions. 
According to Hryn’ko and Volobuev, this had undermined Ukraine’s potential as a national 
economic unit. Moreover, it contradicted the objectives of Ukrainizatsiia, which meant to 
establish the link between the industrial working class and the peasantry.60 In Volobuev’s 
words, Ukraine became a ‘European-type colony’, economically and financially exploited by 
Russia.61 Not only was its national economy over-reliant on raw materials and natural 
resources, but one third of Ukraine’s taxes were being utilised outside of the republic. Instead, 
he advocated rational allocation of resources and financial autarky, which could help Ukraine 
develop a more balanced economic base and better contribute to the economic growth of the 
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Soviet Union as a whole. Needless to say, Volobuev’s position on the national economy, 
articulated in 1928 on the pages of the party journal Bil’shovyk Ukrainy, was quickly compared 
to the opinions expressed by Shums’kyi. Both were accused of promoting national deviationist 
position, labelled respectively ‘volobuevshchyna’ and ‘shums’kism’ and were subsequently 
deposed and relocated. 
 
 
Bolshevik ideology had originated in a complete and total rejection of the oppressive tsarist 
regime. Its implementation was intended to bring peace, distribute land and give bread to the 
people exhausted by World War I, and overcome the political and social chaos into which the 
Russian Empire had descended by 1917. Most importantly, the Bolsheviks promised to 
liberate the peoples of Russia from national, social and political restraints. To achieve all this, 
they needed to defeat numerous enemies of the revolution first. The Bolshevik takeover in 
Petrograd was swift, yet taking the former imperial capital could not guarantee control over 
Russia’s peripheries or its borderlands. Neither could military supremacy ensure immediate 
victory over political and ideological opponents, as the experiences of the civil war had shown.  
 
 
The Bolsheviks needed to secure popular support which would allow them to realise their 
liberationist vision. Significantly, the success of these long-term goals depended on the party 
vanguard’s ability to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat in the country, which had 
neither the industrial capacity nor a well-developed working class. Popular mobilisation was 
the answer to all Bolshevik’s concerns with the party quickly coming to understand the 
potential of the national factor for inciting mass mobilisation. National languages and national 
elites were thus necessary to engage the working class and reach out to the peasantry, who 




The situation in Ukraine forced the Bolsheviks to revise these plans, however. The republic 
was perhaps the most important for the success of their political projects and yet its internal 
contradictions posed a genuine threat to the Bolshevik dictatorship. Various nationalist forces 
fought continuously with the Bolsheviks in trying to preserve their control over territory and 
its resources. Moreover, during the Polish-Soviet war, the competing interests of the two 
governments converged in Ukraine. Nevertheless, nationalist and foreign governments were 
not the main obstacle to the Bolsheviks’ long-term strategies. Unexpectedly, the fiercest 
opposition to the central vision came from within the Ukrainian Bolshevik Party itself. 
Bolshevik modernisation required uniformity and compliance with the centre, including 
readiness to surrender the levers of control to the central party leadership. These expectations 
of absolute obedience, however, were crushed by the intentions of Ukraine-oriented 
communists in the party, empowered by the Bolshevik’s experimentation with nationalism in 
the former imperial the borderlands. 
 
 
By the end of the 1920s it became obvious that Bolshevik ethnic particularism had created 
more problems in Ukraine than it was intended to resolve. As a result of Soviet modernisation 
campaigns, more people had gained access to higher education and promotion opportunities, 
whereas korenizatsiia gave preferential status to those fluent in local languages and created 
ethnic Ukrainian elites who owed their status and positions to the Soviet regime. These new 
nationalised elites began challenging the central leadership, attempting to gain control over 
the power structure and decision-making. More importantly, regional leaders started to 
question the internationalist (Russian) nature of the industrial proletariat - the political base of 




Two Five-Year plans sufficed for the Soviet Union to catch up with, and even surpass many 
of its European neighbours. Moreover, Soviet industrial achievements coincided with major 
strides in social modernisation. In 1939, the party leadership proudly declared the success of 
‘the greatest phenomenon in the history of humankind,’ claiming to have overcome social-
class boundaries through attained literacy levels, access to professional education and 
guaranteed gender equality.62 As soon as ‘backwardness’ became a word of the past, there 
was no further need to engage national elites and encourage national differences. Although 
korenizatsiia was never suspended officially, its course was significantly redefined by the 
urgent need to address the growing influence of the nationalised regional Soviet elites, while 
further encouraging industrialisation. Unsurprisingly, responses to both of these challenges 
coincided. With calls for greater economic efficiency beginning to supplant ethnic interests, 
nation-based persecutions could be easily justified. The intensity of terror in the late 1930s 
reflected the strength of the national ‘deviations’ in the party during the 1920s. In turn, the 
national Soviet elites became strongest in those areas where the Bolsheviks had taken longer 
to consolidate power during the civil war, encapsulated in the example of Soviet Ukraine. 
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